Hierdie artikel is soos volg gepubliseer:

 

2009. Racism, an omnipresent chameleon. 2009. In Larissa Manerko (ed.), Categorization and conceptualization in LSP and professional discourse studies, Мoskou: Rusland, 155-164.

Willem J. Botha

(University of Johannesburg,

                                                                                     Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa)

Racism, an omnipresent chameleon

This article investigates the concept [racism]. It shows that much of the confusion that arises from the interpretation thereof originates from the fact that the noun racism is not derived from a verb, although experiences of racism relate to actions (denoted by verbs) of racism. It suggests that the concept [racism] should be scrutinized next to the concept [racialization] and that both of these concepts should be linked to the concept [discrimination]. A model is proposed with regard to the analysis of the relevant concepts.

Preamble

In 1994 the South African political landscape changed dramatically. In that particular year National Party supremacy came to an end – after a period of forty-six years. The African National Congress became the majority party in a Government of National Unity. A new negotiated interim Constitution came into practice, and eventually a Final Constitution was put into practice on 4 February 1997.

Some of the key features of this Constitution, some of them relevant for this article, involve the following: the Constitution is the supreme instrument with regard to the functioning of the South African society; a democratic political system is embedded within the Constitution; a Bill of Rights protects the defined rights of every citizen; the Constitution provides for an independent Court, which includes the Constitutional Court, and mechanisms (like a single citizenship and assurances of human dignity, equality, nonracism and nonsexism) intended to build a sole nation. Regardless of the aspirations for a single nation, the Constitution also recognizes diversity, by endorsing eleven official languages, nine provinces with semi-autonomous governments, protection of different rights, regarding, amongst others, language rights, cultural rights, religious rights, women’s and children’s rights, recognition of traditional leaders, etc. (cf. Rautenbach and Malherbe, 1998:4-5).

The previously mentioned constitutional principles contrast severely with the ideology of apartheid, one of the cornerstones of previous National Party rule. The term apartheid referred to an official policy of racial segregation, which entailed institutionalized racism. As an ontological metaphor the term apartheid had to function on a superordinate level to accommodate many practices of racial segregation. On an institutionalized basis it involved “political, legal, and economic discrimination against nonwhites”, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary (henceforward AHD 1996). But it involved more detailed legalized practices, such as represented by the following acts, according to D@dalos Education Server: “Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act – mixed marriages are banned; Population Registration Act – all citizens must be classified according to race; Group Areas Act – residential areas in the cities allocated to particular racial groups; Suppression of Communism Act – the government is allowed to ban organizations that it regards as ‘communist’; Reservation of Separate Amenities Act – the ‘small’ apartheid: public amenities and facilities are segregated according to race; Black Education Act – the black education system is detached from the Education ministry”, etc. And even “smaller” non-institutionalized race-related offenses were condoned by the relevant overarching ideology, drawing strict borders between categories of people. No “fuzzy boundaries” existed. A person would have been considered either in or out of the category of “whites”, the “supreme” category – in accordance with the appropriate ideology. Groot Woordeboek / Major Dictionary rightly points out that “(t)he word, and the notion of, apartheid has become obnoxious to the majority of people in the world and has a strong pejorative sense ...”. As expected, in course of time different synonyms were put into action to try to mitigate the word’s emotional force, words and phrases such as separate development, separateness, pluralism, etc. Being ontological metaphors themselves, these words subtracted from a larger conceptual domain – the concept [apartheid] – specific notions which “painted” a more positive state of affairs. This phenomenon will not be analyzed with regard to the word apartheid.

Then came 1994. The new constitution gave rise to hopes for a sole nation – one that is not constituted by different categories (of people) with strict borders. The metaphor rainbow nation, frequently used by former President Nelson Mandela, described this nation to be: a new category with fuzzy boundaries. Against the background of a cognitive process which Fauconnier and Turner (1996:113) call conceptual blending, Botha (2001:52/53) examines the conceptual nature of the relevant metaphor as follows: “(T)he two input spaces, rainbow and nation, share frame structure on account of its relationship with a generic space: both rainbow and nation imply diversity, composition – actually a diverse assortment or collection (from a generic space). As a result the blend suggests a coloured spectrum and several coloured ethnic groups; but this emergent structure does not only suggest a blending of several coloured ethnic groups of a coloured spectrum into one structure (a nation), but also, and even more importantly, the right of each component to keep its autonomy”.

A speech made by the former Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (presently the President), promoted this blend when he expanded the concept [rainbow nation] in an attempt to extend this category to include other subcategories of Africa. In an address on 8 May 1996, when he made a statement on behalf of the ANC, in acceptation of South Africa’s 1996 constitution bill, he introduced the concept of an African Renaissance. In his address he used the ever returning metaphorical statement of I am an African whereby I is taken to stand successively for the whole of Africa, for the whole nation, or for one of its various ethnic groups. Compare Botha (2001) for a detailed analysis.

A new government and the implementation of the new constitution entailed the reconstruction of a new and a just South African society, and – most importantly – the eradication of racism. Consequently new ideological practices created new concepts and the comprehension of such concepts, not only to understand the relevant procedures but also to make a positive contribution to the nationally set objectives, became paramount. Concepts like [transformation], [redress], [black empowerment], [affirmative action], [quota systems], [reconciliation] and many others came into existence. Compare Botha (2004, 2004a, 2007) for a comprehensive discussion of the conceptual contents of some of these terms.

Within the present South African community all of these concepts are – some unambiguously, others in a disguised manner – in a way linked to the concept [racism]. Having a clear understanding of the relevant concept will obviously contribute to a more appreciative and healing society.

But in February / March 2008 one became very aware of the conceptual complexities of the relevant term within the present-day South African community. It was also very obvious that the meaning people have of the specific term relates to what Taylor (2002:187) calls the conceptualization in the minds of language users.

Conceptualization of racism

On 28 February 2008 a reader of The Citizen (a South African news paper) wrote: “There is something terribly wrong with the students of the University of the Free State’s Reitz residence who participated in the video depicting crass racial abuse of campus workers.” This incident took place the previous year, allegedly as a reaction to forced integration within students’ residences by the university authorities.

When this incident became known, it generated vigorous emotional responses not only from within South Africa, but also from abroad. Although this incident was mostly condemned, it became clear that the conceptualization of racism, which was considered as the source of the specific incident, has many faces. The following cursory quotes and summaries in this regard, from different sources, clearly illustrate this phenomenon. After being quoted, certain perspectives on racism will be discerned from the relevant quotes – preceding a linguistic assessment of the concept [racism].

(1)   The chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission, Jody Kollapen, made, amongst others, also the following comments, as reported by the Mail & Guardian Online: “… the lessons we can learn from the last two or three weeks is that racism is alive and well in South Africa …”; “the reconciliation process was at the expense of transformation …” … “in terms of transformation hardly anything was asked of white South Africans …”; “… white South Africa was not really given the opportunity to engage with what happened in the past …”; “… the constitutional right to freedom of association should not be used as a disguise for racism …”.

(2)   In reaction to the previous comments, two commentators subsequently observed as follows. Giliomee (2008) asks the question whether Kollapen really thinks that, what Giliomee calls ethnic cleansing of whites from the government service and semi-government service to make these institutions more representative of the South African population, was no “contribution” from the whites. In the same breath he praises Barack Obama for his view that one should try to understand both black and white anger in the USA – the first because of injustices of the past and the latter because of affirmative action. Greyling (2008) points out that Kollapen promotes the idea of collective guilt when he requires from white people – all white people, and not only those who supported apartheid – to ask for forgiveness.

(3)   In another article Greyling (2008a) refers to the view of a prof. Sipho Seepe, who suggests that one can only “solve” the problem of racism if one can understand it. Greyling doubts whether it is possible to have a full understanding of the concept at all. Another important aspect that Greyling mentions is the fact that Seepe views racism as something that is only experienced by blacks. Contrary to such a view, Greyling points out examples from the South African society to illustrate that whites also experience racism.

(4)   Buys (2008) also distinguishes between black and white racism. In his view racism under black people is usually to be found under the black elite, while amongst white people it manifests itself in the midst of what he calls the “lower levels” of the community.

(5)   From a black perspective Lizeka Mda, previously deputy managing editor of the Sunday Times and executive editor at The Star (South African English newspapers), responding on the most recent South African racial incidents, made the comment in Rapport (Afrikaans Sunday newspaper) that “when nonsense was issued, white South Africans were the foremost recipients”.

(6)   Esterhuyse (2008) uses the metaphors black elephant and white elephant not only to make a distinction between black and white people, but also to suggest the underlying destructive force of racism within sections of these communities. He also uses another metaphor to label the word racist: a political sledge-hammer that is used to batter people, institutions and groups. He also distinguishes between what he calls naked racism, the practice that considers people of the “other” race as incompetent and inferior, and subtle (or hidden) racism, when somebody tries to “explain” a racial incident.

From the previous comments and remarks involving the phenomenon racism, an extraction can be made of a few cognitive principles that are linguistically very significant with regard to the meaning and understanding of the concept [racism], summarized as follows:

·        The fact that some commentators consider the judgment of racism from a black as well as a white perspective, while others consider the practice thereof to be an only white issue and the experience of racism as an only black concern, suggests that racism relates to vantage point.

·        Reference to whites as if they are all alike (within other contexts reference to blacks as if they are all similar) lay emphasis on the stereotyping mechanism underlying racism. As such it relates to the cognitive principle of categorization.

·        Racism has an instigator as well as an experient. Mostly an instigated act is judged to be an act of racism by the experient or an allegedly non-involved observer by way of sympathy, empathy or moral judgment.

·        The condemnation of the specific incident that generated the intense debate about racism, by both whites and blacks, put the accent on the moral basis of the judgment of racism.

·        Due to its complex nature, the category which the concept [racism] entails, inevitably gets subcategorized and metaphorized; compare naked racism; subtle racism; hidden racism; white racism; black racism; etc.

The diverse nature of the relevant concept, as illustrated in the previous paragraphs – but also within a broader view, relates to the fact that onomasiological[1] and semasiological views with regard to the concept, overlap. Although Taylor (1995:262) postulates that onomasiological and semasiological views do not necessarily reflect “mirror images of each other”, he also acknowledges the fact that a specific linguistic expression is mostly determined by onomasiological as well as semasiological salience (cf. Dirven and Verspoor, 1999:54). This could perhaps be the reason why some people very often allege that they experience racism, but fail to label the relevant experience in terms of defining words. This was clearly illustrated by De Wet (2004) in a research on educators’ experience of racism in education in South Africa. It was found that 64% of the respondents in an empirical study abstained from answering the question “What is racism?” – although they alleged that they experienced racism in their working environment.

Whilst the previous discussion mainly concentrated on a conceptualist view of racism, it is essential for a clearer understanding of the relevant concept to also verify the meaning of the word racism from a semasiological perspective, examining the different senses of the word in an effort to establish a prototypical meaning.

Many analyses of the relevant concept fail to integrate the two approaches efficiently in an effort to establish a working definition for their assessment of the relevant phenomenon. Some only concentrate on different lexicographical definitions, whilst others take a rather intuitive stance, relying mainly on their own conceptualization.

Defining racism

A working definition

An ideal working definition should be the result of a prototype approach in the sense in which Langacker (1987:371) describes it as “a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype”. In this regard one should also bear in mind that there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity, often determined by different cultures and different contexts.

But what would be the best instance of racism in the same sense that murder is a better example of the category kill than execute, lie is a better example of the category cheat than deceive, stride is a better example of the category walk than pace, and grasp is a better example of the category clutch than hold (cf. Pulman, 1983:113)? In other words, does the same superordinate-hyponym-relation exist between racism and a word on a hyponym-level, functioning as a prototype of the specific category – like murder and execute are hyponyms of kill, etc.? Unfortunately not.

Consequently it is not strange that Groenewald (2004:14) points out that on a definition of racism, sociologists differ immensely. This is probably true for many other disciplines as well, given that so many accusations and denials of racism lead to a confused comprehension of the relevant concept when people are asked to define it. She also mentions that there exists some general consensus between several authors within the specific discipline that there should not be any reason why the term cannot have different meanings, based on the argument that accepting too broad a definition renders the term “analytically meaningless”. Such an approach indeed creates a chameleon, changing its colours within the contexts it is being used – a typical vantage point phenomenon. In this regard Groenewald (2004:8) suggests that legislators should understand how different groups define racism, when they promulgate laws against racism, or else a proposed law will probably not be legitimate in the eyes of the majority.

Another relevant aspect that Groenewald (2004:8) mentions, involves the research of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). She regards their inquiry into racism in the media as probably the most prominent recent study involving original research on racism in South Africa, at that stage: 2004. They commissioned the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) to undertake quantitative research on racism in the media. Although the MMP used stereotypes to measure racism, they did not define racism explicitly, and conducted their research on such a fragile basis. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not concerned with an explicit definition of racism, according to Groenewald (2004:14). Her conclusion: “It therefore reviews international and local conventions for regulating and eliminating racism without conceptualizing the term.”

Confronted with the fact that the SAHRC did not depart from an explicit definition of racism, they referred to the definition accepted by the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racism and Discrimination (ICERD), according to Groenewald (2004:29). The relevant definition reads as follows:

Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (SAHRC, 2000: 56).

Groenewald’s observations underpin the fact that the concept [racism] is mostly dealt with on account of rather intuitive judgments of the meaning of the specific linguistic expression representing the concept.

In search of a prototype

The above-mentioned definition of the ICERD also illustrates the intertwined relationship between the onomasiological and semasiological perspectives, although in an unsystematic fashion. In spite of its shortcomings, the application of the deverbalized nouns (distinction derived from the verb to distinguish, exclusion derived from the verb to exclude, restriction derived from the verb to restrict and preference derived from the verb to prefer) illustrate a few important matters. Firstly, the deverbalized nouns imply that racism is the result of one or other action (deed). This issue wil be returned to. Secondly, the application of the different deverbalized nouns suggests a lexicographical (sense-relation) approach, and as such a semasiological perspective. Very conspicuous is the fact that the word discrimination is not used in a sense-relation manner within the relevant definition, particularly when one considers the fact that the research of De Wet (2004) reveals that 88% of the 36% who did answer the question “What is racism?”, used the word discrimination to explicate the concept [racism].

Botha (2006:117) argues that due to the fact that many people use the words racism and discrimination interchangeably, on the assumption that the one implies the other, substantiates the view that there exists a close sense relationship between the words racism and discrimination. He also assumes that in many contexts the tie between the two concepts becomes so close that language users often fail to recognize the fact that the relevant concept’s relation depends on the principle of unilateral implication (hyponymy); hence the word racism implies discrimination, but the word discrimination does not necessarily imply racism.

Although it was hypothesized, earlier in this discussion, that one of the hyponyms on a co-hyponym level generally functions as a prototype of the relevant superordinate, we find the opposite in the case of the concept [racism]. The sense of discrimination is encapsulated by the concept [racism]. Accordingly discrimination can be considered as the prototype of racism, but with a reservation: a sense has to be added – in this instance racial; therefore racial discrimination, to distinguish it from other kinds of discrimination, for instance sexism.

To substantiate the previous claim that discrimination can be considered as the prototype of racism, Botha (2006) also examines the lexicographical definitions of the word racism from six different English dictionaries[2]. Compare Botha (2006) for a detailed discussion. The concept of differentiation is implied in all the definitions, explicitly spelled out as “discrimination” in Merriam-Webster OnLine and Compact Oxford English Dictionary. Consequently one has to investigate the nature of the concept [discrimination].

Discrimination as a prototypical act of racism

Although most of the lexicographical definitions of racism refer to racism as a “belief” as its primary sense, they also refer to some kind of “behaviour” on account of such a belief as a secondary sense. But it is important to be aware of the fact that the linguistic expression racism is not derived from a verb. One must also realize that a belief can only manifest itself by way of one or other act (or deed). Therefore the concept [racism] is exemplified by a more cognitive convenient concept that could be related to an action by way of its linguistic manifestation in a root verb, namely to discriminate. This also contributes to the fact that the concept [discrimination] functions on a prototypical level to unveil the concept [racism]. Consequently, to have a better understanding of racism, one should also focus on the root thereof, namely the verb to discriminate.

Scrutinizing four different dictionaries’ treatment of the polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate, Botha (2006:118-120) finds that a distinction should be drawn between two basic senses of the verb to discriminate. The first sense relates to a basic conceptual action which determines categorization, something we do when we become aware of the difference in or between entities. In this regard the verb to discriminate entails the practice of categorization, the most fundamental conceptual experience in thought, perception, action and speech, according to Lakoff (1987:5). The second (race-related) sense refers to actions or attitudes: “show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)” (cf. Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus).

The question arises: How does the basic senses of the verb to discriminate relate to the concept [racism]?

A historical view reveals that a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate should not necessarily be regarded as the primary sense. According to the Oxford Talking Dictionary the first recorded use of the word discriminate took place between 1600 – 1629, while the first recorded use of a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate took place between 1870 – 1899, and it was only 1930 – 1969 that the first recorded use of the word racism took place.           

But some dictionaries also differentiate between the terms racism and racialization, although they consider them as synonyms, regarding racism as a dated term (cf. American Heritage Dictionary; Collins Dictionary of the English language). Contrary to such a view, Miles (1989), as quoted by Gullestad (2004:185-186), differentiates between the two terms: “While racialization is a natural cognitive process, racism is a negative continuation of that process.” In view of the two basic senses of the verb to discriminate, referred to in the previous paragraph, the concept [racialization] relates to the first basic sense of the verb to discriminate while the concept [racism] entails the second primary sense of the relevant verb.

The practice of racism

As was mentioned previously, there is no consistency within many monolingual dictionaries with regard to discrimination as part of the meaning of the word racism. They mostly refer to a “belief that races have distinctive … characteristics” (cf. Collins English Dictionary), therefore implying a conceptual process of differentiating. By implication they also admit that a belief will not be visible without any explicated manifestation. As a result they suggest an act and also a resulting effect as part of its meaning of the word; compare: “… the resulting unfair treatment of members of other races …” (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary); “… any program or practice of racial discrimination, segregation, etc., specif., such a program or practice that upholds the political or economic domination of one race over another or others” and “feelings or actions of hatred and bigotry toward a person or persons because of their race” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary); and “discrimination, or antagonism based on this” (i.e. belief) (Oxford Talking Dictionary).

Against this background, and assuming that the two senses of discrimination (“categorization”  and “race-related actions and attitudes”) can be considered to relate to racialization and racism respectively, the following model is a modification of Botha’s (2006:126) proposal for a differentiation between neutral race-related categorization and a prototypical racist act.

Figure 1. Prototypical discriminating act, constituting either racialization or racism

Figure 1 represents a dichotomy of discriminating actions. Both actions originate in the cognitive unconscious, but they take different routes due to different intentions. Should one have an unbiased intent, to categorize for conceptual purposes only, then the end result (effect) will be referential in nature, disclosed by referring (descriptive) expressions. Such a discriminating act will represent the final and neutral stage on the continuum: non-racism – racism.

Should the intent be biased, it results from the fact that the specific individual wants to categorize (on the basis of racial criteria) to cause individual or collective advantage(s) and/or disadvantage(s) – physically, socially, culturally, mentally, descriptively or other. It implies the blend with numerous other conceptual maneuvers:  adding a specific value; establishing stereotypes; highlighting category boundaries, etc. Such an intent will be strengthened by a relative force – induced by imagined or real personal, social, cultural, political or other powers – determining the degree of racist practice.

As a result a mental and/or physical act takes place. The nature of the (speech) act determines the degree of racism that is explicitly expressed or implicated. Therefore it is very often the case that when a typical racism mechanism like stereotyping is applied, not only stereotyping as such manifests racism, but also the underlying speech act. Compare for example Kollapen’s words in (1), repeated here as (7):

(7)    “in terms of transformation hardly anything was asked of white South Africans …”; “… white South Africa was not really given the opportunity to engage with what happened in the past …”

This is not only a racist act on account of the stereotyping of whites, but it is also an underlying racist act owing to its speech act nature: an accusation directed to white people as such. In this regard it should be mentioned that an act (deed[3]) is a very complex phenomenon – and if we assume that an act (deed) is an implicit semantic feature of the the word racism, then it is not difficult to understand why people have so many different conceptualizations of the relevant word.

The effect of a prototypical racist act is beneficial and/or disadvantageous to specific individuals and/or groups with respect to personal, emotional, social, cultural and other relevant experiences. The model in figure 1 shows that the effect of the relevant act manifests itself on a continuum. On account of such a continuum one could distinguish degrees of racism, such as a non-racism, subtle racism, mild racism and harsh racism. Gullestad (2004:186) doubts whether racialization in a neutral sense is possible when she postulates:  “Interpretations of differences are not universal, but emerge in historically specific processes as human beings give meaning to what goes on around them. When some physical features appear as particularly visible, it is not only due to the features themselves, but to historically specific frames of interpretation that have become self-evident and self-explanatory for many people. Visibility, in the sense of prominent features that are invested with particular meanings, is not natural and universal but is historically specific and culturally produced and reproduced through fleeting and shifting negotiations.” Her interpretation is indeed acceptable, but only when one considers the distinction between racialization and racism as absolute – and not a matter of degree!

Conclusion

The phenomenon racism undeniably constitutes a very complex concept on account of the fact that people within different contexts conceptualize it differently.

The previous discussion emphasized some of the key issues with regard to such a conceptual confusion. One of the main reasons involves the fact that the noun racism is not derived from a specific verb, although accusations of racism mostly depend on experiences of acts (therefore explicated by specific verbs) of alleged racism. Such acts are so diverse in nature that it is impossible to give an inventory of possible verbs denoting possible racist actions. Even the ICERD’s definition of racism implies alleged racism verbs (to distinguish, to exclude, to restrict, to prefer) that have no relation to racism at all when it is viewed out of context. Contrary to such a definition many people, on an intuitive basis, experience racism as a kind of discrimination – although many lexicographical definitions do not formulate it as such.

For whatever reason it should be necessary to define or describe the concept [racism] – political, scientific, religious, etc. – this article takes the view that a systematic and comprehensive linguistic account should motivate it. In this regard there should exist an awareness of the fact that onomasiological as well as semasiological approaches – and an intertwined relation between the two approaches – contribute to a full understanding of the relevant concept; that the concept [racism] implies an underlying verb of action, first and foremost the verb discriminate; that a distinction can be drawn between the concepts [racialization] and [racism], and that these two concepts merge on the basis of discriminatory experiences reflected on a continuum.

Should this not happen, one finds contradictions such as the following. In explicitly dealing with the “racism-relevant” concept [equality], the South African Constitution implicitly condones certain kinds of discrimination, formulated as follows:

(8)   “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race[4], gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.

   Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair”.^[5]

Contrary to that a Bill of Rights protects the defined rights of every citizen, with a guarantee, amongst others, of nonracism.

Should all the confusions about the concept [racism] be taken into consideration – and the fact that vantage point plays a very important role with regard to the understanding of the relevant concept – one can indeed conclude that racism is an omnipresent chameleon!

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29.  Miles, Robert. 1989. Racism. London: Routledge (referred to by Gullestad, 2004).

30.  Microsoft. 1996. Excerpts from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition © 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation.

31.  Compact Oxford English Dictionary. 2006. http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/racism?view=uk. Accessed April 2008.

32.  Pulman, S.G. 1983. Word meaning and belief. London & Canberra: Croom Helm.

33.  SAHRC. 2000. Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media. Johannesburg: SAHRC (as quoted by Groenewald, 2004).

34.  Rautenbach, Ignatius M. and Erasmus F. J. Malherbe. 1998. Wat sê die Grondwet? Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik.

35.  Taylor, John R. 1995. Linguistic Categorization. Prototypes in Linguistic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

36.  Taylor, John R. 2002. Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

37.  The Citizen. 2008. Opinion articles tagged ‘University of the Free State’. They urinate on the rainbow nation. http://www.citizen.co.za/index/keysection.aspx?section=Opinion&kw=University%20of%20the%20Free%20State. Accessed March 2008.

 

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[1]The onomasiological approach to meaning investigates the relationship of a concept with regard to different words used to refer to the relevant concept, while the semasiological approach examines the different senses of a word (cf. Dirven and Verspoor, 1999:31-59).

[2]Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary; Compact Oxford English Dictionary; Encarta World English Dictionary; Merriam-Webster OnLine; Oxford Talking Dictionary; Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus.

[3] Examining the radial network of the word deed, Botha (2006a) accentuates the complexity of its semantic nature. Compare Botha (2006a).

[4]This paper is only concerned with the concept race.

^[5]Act 108 of 1996: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 1: Bill of Rights, p. 7.