The linguistics of racism

Paper read on 5 July 2005 at a conference of the International Society for Political Psychology in Toronto, Canada

 

1. Introduction

·        Racism in South Africa is alive and well! That is at least the impression one gets when one opens a daily newspaper and takes notice of the frequency of the word racism (and related words) that appear in news and in-depth articles.

·        Ironically, post-apartheid South Africa is supposed to be ridden from the practices of racism - especially when one takes into account the fact that the South African Constitution deals explicitly with the "racism-relevant" concept equality.

·        But the essence of the problem lies, in my view, in the formulation of the relevant articles 9 (3), (4) & (5), reading as follows:

  9. (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

   (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.

   (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.

·        Although the principle of fair discrimination is also accepted in other communities, for instance the Dutch community - in which case it is called "positieve discriminatie" (positive discrimination) - the essence of the problem lies in the principle itself, as it is reflected by the adjectives fair and unfair and the noun discrimination with regard to the practices of racism - but most importantly, in the way people understand these concepts pertaining to its linguistic use and its relevant communicative and social practices.

·        Should semantic criteria be taken into consideration, the adjective fair falls within the class adjectives of judgement. As such its meaning does not suggest factuality. Consequently, individual judgement will determine many different readings of the sense of the relevant word.

·        Another complicating factor with regard to the adjective fair involves the fact the experience of its meaning reflects the conceptualizer's moral judgement on account of a certain fairness metaphorical model (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:297). With regard to the model of equality of distribution Lakoff & Johnson (1999:297) rightly illustrates the complexity of the fairness concept in the following words:

"(T)here are a myriad of cases in which people generally agree on the necessity of some procedural rules of distribution, but find at times that following those 'fair' procedures results in a distribution of goods or opportunities that conflicts with their sense of rights-based fairness or equality of distribution fairness. In such cases there is typically no overarching neutral conception of fairness that can resolve the conflict of values."

·        In this regard fairness could lead to what Gullestad (2004:187) calls "racism in the name of the good".

·        Within the limits of this paper racism in relation to morality can not be dealt with furthermore. The next section will therefore focus on the parameters of this talk.

2. Theoretical framework and structure

·        Against the background of the above-mentioned principle, I will scrutinize aspects of the concept racism from a cognitive linguistic view. The analysis will be done in view of two general theoretical assumptions within cognitive linguistics, that is:

1. The conceptualist approach to meaning renders more viable analytical mechanisms than the language-world approach and the language internal-approach - although the language internal-approach will be taken into consideration when the dictionary descriptions of the relevant concept is scrutinized.

2. Language structure provides important evidence about fundamental mental phenomena which have general psychological importance, and which are founded on linguistic evidence, such as force dynamics, image schemas, subjective versus objective construal, correspondence across cognitive domains, and  cognitive reference point - cf. Langacker (1993:1).

 This paper will be structured as follows:

1. A few dictionary definitions of the word racism will be examined.

2. A distinction will be made between the words racialization and racism. Reference will be made to the imprint of racism by virtue of underlying image schemas and categorizing mechanisms.

3. The fundamental nature of racism will be scrutinized on account of a prototypical act of racism.

 3. Dictionary definitions of the word racism

·        Departing from a language-internal approach, an analysis of the definitions of the word racism from three different dictionaries reveals a rather complex conceptual structure. In this regard the following observations can be put forward:

1. The word racism embraces concepts associated with words like prejudice, animosity, belief, adherence to, advocacy, doctrine, program, practice, feeling and action on the presumption that people are to be differentiated on account of different characteristics which are manifestations of superiority or inferiority. It is also assumed that the conceptual contents of words like prejudice, discrimination and antagonism link with the relevant concept.

2. It appears that there exists no lexical interrelationship between the word racism and the associated words, merely because they are not associated on account of equivalence of meaning (synonymy), or as a result of opposite meanings (antonymy), nor meaning inclusiveness (hyponymy). [It does not imply that the relevant word does not belong to other lexical networks.] This phenomenon could be one of the reasons that in a 2004-research on educator's experience of racism in education (in South Africa), it was found that 64% of the respondents in an empirical study abstained from answering the question "What is racism?" (cf. De Wet, 2004:28). The same research also revealed that 88% of the 36% who did answer the question, used the word discrimination (cf. De Wet, 2004:31) to explicate the relevant concept. From a linguistic point of view, this finding illustrates a basic cognitive principle: we tend to exemplify (understand) more abstract concepts in terms of more specific concepts - in this instance an action. In other words: racism is not an act(ion); but to discriminate is - to be precise, the word racism does not have a verb correlate, but discrimination has: to discriminate. Incidentally, this linguistic feature applies to perhaps the most - if not all - -ism-words, for instance capitalism; communism; socialism; etc.

4. Discrimination as a prototypical act of racism

·        The previous assertion, namely that the concept racism is exemplified by a more cognitive convenient concept that could be related to an action by way of its linguistic manifestation in a root verb, is implicitly revealed in most lexicographical definitions of the word racism - since the phenomenon 'racism' primarily deals with differences. But differences have to be brought to the fore by an action! From this point of view one could deduct that the concept discrimination functions on a prototypical level to unveil the concept racism. This view is supported by the Van Dale (Dutch) dictionary which considers the sense "discrimination owing to race" as one of the fundamental lexicographical definitions of the word racism. If this is the case, a more fundamental investigation should turn the focus to the root, namely the verb to discriminate.

4.1. Polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate

·        An examination of different dictionaries' treatment of the polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate discloses a rather irregular semantic pattern. Within lexicographical practice three major ordering patterns exist to arrange these senses, namely on historical grounds, primary vs. secondary meanings and empirical analysis (referring to the frequency of the relevant word's use). The Webster's New World Dictionary & Thesaurus differentiates between the transitive and intransitive uses of the relevant verb, listing the senses respectively as follows:

 "1 v.t. to constitute a difference between; differentiate. v.t. 2 to recognize the difference between; distinguish. v.i. 1 to see the difference (between things); distinguish. v.i. 2 to be discerning. v.i. 3 to make distinctions in treatment; show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)."

·        The Oxford Talking Dictionary follows a similar model; compare:

"1 v.t. Make or constitute a difference in or between; distinguish, differentiate. E17. 2 v.t. Distinguish with the mind; perceive the difference in or between. M17. 3 v.i. Make or recognize a distinction, esp. a fine one; provide or serve as a distinction; exercise discernment. L18. 4 v.i. Make a distinction in the treatment of different categories of people or things, esp. unjustly or prejudicially against people on grounds of race, colour, sex, social status, age, etc. L19."

·        The Encarta World English Dictionary also distinguishes three senses, but contrary to the previous dictionaries, it puts the race-related sense first - consequently, and presumably, the primary sense, according to this dictionary:

"1 intransitive verb treat group unfairly because of prejudice: to treat one person or group worse than others or better than others, usually because of a prejudice about race, ethnic group, age group, religion, or gender. 2 intransitive and transitive verb discern difference: to recognize or identify a difference · could not discriminate between red and green. 3 intransitive verb be aware of differences: to pay attention to subtle differences and exercise judgment and taste."

·        The Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal (Dutch Dictionary) distinguishes two senses, and in accordance with the Encarta World English Dictionary, they consider the race-related sense as the primary one.

"1 discriminatie toepassen ten opzichte van, niet gelijk behandelen de Chinezen in Maleisië voelen zich gediscrimineerd. 2 tussen twee gelijkende voorwerpen onderscheiden een microscoop met een uitstekend discriminerend vermogen."

4.2.      First recorded uses of the basic senses of the verb to discriminate and the noun racism

·        When we examine, from a historical point of view, the first recorded uses of certain senses of the words to discriminate and racism, some uncertainty arises regarding the fact that a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate should be regarded as the primary one; compare the following historical facts in connection with different senses, according to the Oxford Talking Dictionary:

1. The first recorded use of the word discriminate took place between 1600 - 1629.

2. The first recorded use of a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate took place between 1870 - 1899.

3. The first recorded use of the word racism took place between 1930 - 1969.

4.3.      Distinction between the basic senses of the verb to discriminate

·        The previous analysis suggests that a distinction should be drawn between two basic senses of the verb to discriminate. The first sense relates to a basic conceptual action which determines categorization, something we do when we become aware of the difference in or between entities, something we do when we "distinguish with the mind" (Oxford Talking Dictionary). It is important to notice the use of the prepositions in and between in this description. In this regard, the verb to discriminate entails the practice of categorization, the most fundamental conceptual experience in thought, perception, action and speech, according to Lakoff (1987:5), explicated by him as follows:

"Every time we see something as a kind of thing … we are categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of things … we are employing categories."

·        The second (race-related) sense refers to actions or attitudes with regard to the prepositions for or against, as described by the Webster's New World Dictionary & Thesaurus as "show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)".

4.4.      The relationship between the basic senses of the verb to discriminate and the concept racism

·        The previous distinction links with different approaches Gullestad (2004:177-203) discusses with regard to the definition of racism. She examines two anthropologists' definitions of racism as applied to contemporary Norwegian society. Relevant for this discussion is the view of Inger-Lise Lien (1996 - as mentioned by Gullestad, 2004), and the way in which Lien (Lien, 1997 - as discussed in Gullestad, 2004:185-186) sees it according to Miles' (1989) definition, differentiating between the concepts racialization and racism:

"While racialization is a natural cognitive process, racism is a negative continuation of that process."

·        The concept racialization relates to the first basic sense of the verb to discriminate, referred to in the previous paragraph, while the concept racism entails the second primary sense of the relevant verb.

·        In  this respect Gullestad (2004:186) has serious doubts whether the fact that people merely notice differences (the cognitive process referred to as racialization, for instance black and white skin color), can be considered a natural cognitive process. She postulates:

"Interpretations of differences are not universal, but emerge in historically specific processes as human beings give meaning to what goes on around them. When some physical features appear as particularly visible, it is not only due to the features themselves, but to historically specific frames of interpretation that have become self-evident and self-explanatory for many people. Visibility, in the sense of prominent features that are invested with particular meanings, is not natural and universal but is historically specific and culturally produced and reproduced through fleeting and shifting negotiations."

·        This observation relates to MacLaury's (1991:59) viewpoint that the selective emphasis on the prototype choice (of a category) is determined by vantage point - therefore also extended to a certain cultural frame; as a result "(d)ifferent individuals place importance on distinct attributes of the members of a category. Conse-quently, they select different members as prototypical, they rank members at different values, and they contract or dilate a category to different extents." This phenomenon is also evident when a paradigm (category) is conceptually reduced to such an extent that it results in stereotyping, "a conventional idea associated with a word, which might well be inaccurate", according to Lakoff (1987:168).

·        Stereotyping usually underlies the act of discrimination on a racial basis.

5. A racial imprint

·        Both the views of Gullestad and MacLaury tie with one of the fundamental findings in cognitive linguistics, namely the fact that many (abstract) concepts relate to image schemas, which are preconceptual gestalts within the cognitive unconscious. They are acquired by way of our bodily experience of the physical world we live in. Repeated experiences of related spatial and force phenomena create these gestalts - gestalts that are linguistically manifested. Compare how the container image schema enables us to talk of both concrete and abstract containers: in the box vs. in trouble. One of our very basic spatial experiences relates to proximity, and the schema that is based on this experience, is called the proximity schema. In view of the experience of proximity, one has a closer relationship to comforting entities and situations, and a more distant relation to discomforting entities and situations. Taylor (1995:134) maintains that the "degree of emotional involvement and the possibility of mutual influence are understood in terms of proximity".

·        Against this background I want to assume that in a country like South Africa, where an official (racist) policy of apartheid was created and maintained for almost fifty years, the proximity schema had an important influence on many individuals' categorical (group) development. Legislation based on racial segregation enabled this principle - with its closer to as well as its more distant experiences - to be manifested in the social lifes of individuals, to such an extent that one can easily speak of the existence of a racial imprint in the cognitive setup of both black and white people. The fact that De Wet's (2004:28-37) research reveals that both black and white people still experience racism in education, in spite of the stipulations of the Constitution and efforts to build a non-racial society, in some sense supports this view. Although, merely judged on perception, one notices a big difference between the way adults and children accept each other on the basis of race since 1994. Children of different racial backgrounds tend to be more adaptable, and although most adults really persist in efforts to maintain good racial relations, the undertones of racism are very often perceived in potential stereotyping situations triggered by emotional incentives.

·        The previous assumption also rests on another basic mental phenomenon, namely the way in which we construe meaning in a subjectivised or objectivised way. Children, these days, experience the concept of race in a more subjectivised way, to such an extent that they are presumably mostly unaware of the fact that strict conceptual boundaries for the category 'race' could exist. Contrary to this categorical experience adults' views may still be objectivised in many instances - in other words they accept, but they are still very aware of firm differences based on a developed prejudiced view. Such an attitude is very often revealed by emotional experiences of some kind - experiences that relate to category membership.

·        The awareness of race on the basis of the above mentioned experiences relate to the concepts racialization and racism. Racialization implies a subjectivised experience of race, while racism entails an objectivised experience of race, adding (almost certainly stereotyped on account of pre-conceptual schemas) values to differences.

6. Conclusion: the concept racism as a conceptual blend

·        To endeavour a conclusion some of the previous assumptions need to be reiterated.

·        The concept RACISM implies a conceptual blend of many different kinds of actions. The primary action that reveals racism, is exemplified by the verb to discriminate. Examination of the dictionary meanings of this verb reveals two basic senses:

 Firstly, it means to categorize, to apply boundaries in order to place different kinds of entities in different kinds of paradigms on account of certain differentiating criteria. Such a mental action is a normal conceptualizing action.

·        The second sense involves the experience of another kind of mental action that blends with the first one: to add a value to the relevant category. Should this value be based on racial criteria, one could consider it to be a racist intend. But values as such derive from different conceptual blends from a specific experiential frame that involves historical, cultural, social, personal and many other kinds of variables. When Gullestad (2004:186) mentions "interpretation", she actually merges two conceptual operations: categorizing is the first mental operation; adding a value to the category constitutes a next operation. She only mentions the second one.

·        As was mentioned previously, our ability to categorize is the most fundamental mental process in order to make sense of the world we live in, or to give meaning to what we experience. To add a value to a category is just one of many cognitive (also blending) mechanisms we use to manoeuvre a category conceptually. Other mechanisms involve, inter alia, establishing the prototype or prototype schema of a category, determining the resemblance of other category members to the prototype, and to highlight or weaken the boundaries of a category.

·        With regard to racism we can accentuate two variables that determine, in my view, the degree of racist practice. Perhaps one should rather label racism on account of this criterion (the relative effect of racism), rather than the traditional eclectic distinction that is made with regard to the status of the individuals who practice racism and/or to the context it has an effect on: institutionalised (structural), non-institutionalised (individual) and cultural racism. The two views I wish to mention, are:

1. The way in which one manoeuvres a category conceptually on account of a racial criterion, determines the degree of racism one practices. Stereotyping is an example of such a manoeuvre. In such occasions prejudice - perhaps on account of isolated experiences - may play a dominant role. The outcome in such instances may be mild or severe, depending on the status of the racist practitioner or the nature and intensity of the speech act accompanying the racist intend. Should it be racist legislation, like in the previous apartheid South Africa, the racist outcome is very harsh. But even without legislation, stereotyping by a head of state could have a very intense outcome. The way in which racial boundaries are conceptualized, is another intensifying factor. While apartheid South Africa was an example of the application of the strict-boundary-principle, post-apartheid South Africa is not without it. It can be argued that affirmative action, black empowerment, and even transformation as such, rest on this principle. If a minister (of sport) explicitly states that "ethnic blacks" should be the ones who should be benefited the most, then there is little doubt whether it could be considered a racist action.

2. The relative power one has access to, determines the degree of racism one can practice. Legislative power and the way it is executed would obviously be the most vigorous mechanism for the itensity of racist practices. Apartheid South Africa was a good example of such authoritative racist practices - even in linguistic disguise, using synonyms like the following to give a milder image of the concept: separate development, pluralism, etc. Judging the views of different commentators with regard to post-apartheid South Africa, one gets the impression that in many instances the practice of racism presently goes in the disguise of words and phrases like affirmative action, black empowerment, black ethnicity - and even transformation. What one has to take cognisance of, is the fact that the word used can have a weakening or strengthening effect on the impression of the action it refers to. A very interesting phenomenon in this regard is revealing itself presently. Although the government is predominantly black, and the ruling party (the ANC) comes from a black freedom movement, and they are the people who have the power to apply transformation with all its implications, they still accuse white people of racism, while many white people accuse the present rulers of racism owing to the discriminating practices of transformation, affirmative action, black empowerment, implementation of quota systems, creating a work force which will represent the demographic image of the country, etc. - which they not only have the power to practice, but which they are allowed to do under the auspices of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution (as was explicated in the introduction of this paper). This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that many smaller domains of empowerment are still controlled by white people - white people who are still in managerial positions, white people who still have economic and financial power, white people who still have educational power, etc., although the public realm is not a white public space anymore (to use the words of Gullestad, 2004:187).

·        Against the background of the previous discusssion I venture, in conclusion, the following model to present a prototypical act of racism on account of the distinction between racialization and racism.

Figure 1: Prototypical discriminating act, constituting either racialization or racism

 

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