Hierdie artikel is soos volg gepubliseer:

 

2009. Racism, an omnipresent chameleon. 2009. In Larissa Manerko (ed.), Categorization and conceptualization in LSP and professional discourse studies, Мoskou: Rusland, 155-164.

Willem J. Botha

(University of Johannesburg,

                                                                                     Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa)

Racism, an omnipresent chameleon

This article investigates the concept [racism]. It shows that much of the confusion that arises from the interpretation thereof originates from the fact that the noun racism is not derived from a verb, although experiences of racism relate to actions (denoted by verbs) of racism. It suggests that the concept [racism] should be scrutinized next to the concept [racialization] and that both of these concepts should be linked to the concept [discrimination]. A model is proposed with regard to the analysis of the relevant concepts.

Preamble

In 1994 the South African political landscape changed dramatically. In that particular year National Party supremacy came to an end – after a period of forty-six years. The African National Congress became the majority party in a Government of National Unity. A new negotiated interim Constitution came into practice, and eventually a Final Constitution was put into practice on 4 February 1997.

Some of the key features of this Constitution, some of them relevant for this article, involve the following: the Constitution is the supreme instrument with regard to the functioning of the South African society; a democratic political system is embedded within the Constitution; a Bill of Rights protects the defined rights of every citizen; the Constitution provides for an independent Court, which includes the Constitutional Court, and mechanisms (like a single citizenship and assurances of human dignity, equality, nonracism and nonsexism) intended to build a sole nation. Regardless of the aspirations for a single nation, the Constitution also recognizes diversity, by endorsing eleven official languages, nine provinces with semi-autonomous governments, protection of different rights, regarding, amongst others, language rights, cultural rights, religious rights, women’s and children’s rights, recognition of traditional leaders, etc. (cf. Rautenbach and Malherbe, 1998:4-5).

The previously mentioned constitutional principles contrast severely with the ideology of apartheid, one of the cornerstones of previous National Party rule. The term apartheid referred to an official policy of racial segregation, which entailed institutionalized racism. As an ontological metaphor the term apartheid had to function on a superordinate level to accommodate many practices of racial segregation. On an institutionalized basis it involved “political, legal, and economic discrimination against nonwhites”, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary (henceforward AHD 1996). But it involved more detailed legalized practices, such as represented by the following acts, according to D@dalos Education Server: “Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act – mixed marriages are banned; Population Registration Act – all citizens must be classified according to race; Group Areas Act – residential areas in the cities allocated to particular racial groups; Suppression of Communism Act – the government is allowed to ban organizations that it regards as ‘communist’; Reservation of Separate Amenities Act – the ‘small’ apartheid: public amenities and facilities are segregated according to race; Black Education Act – the black education system is detached from the Education ministry”, etc. And even “smaller” non-institutionalized race-related offenses were condoned by the relevant overarching ideology, drawing strict borders between categories of people. No “fuzzy boundaries” existed. A person would have been considered either in or out of the category of “whites”, the “supreme” category – in accordance with the appropriate ideology. Groot Woordeboek / Major Dictionary rightly points out that “(t)he word, and the notion of, apartheid has become obnoxious to the majority of people in the world and has a strong pejorative sense ...”. As expected, in course of time different synonyms were put into action to try to mitigate the word’s emotional force, words and phrases such as separate development, separateness, pluralism, etc. Being ontological metaphors themselves, these words subtracted from a larger conceptual domain – the concept [apartheid] – specific notions which “painted” a more positive state of affairs. This phenomenon will not be analyzed with regard to the word apartheid.

Then came 1994. The new constitution gave rise to hopes for a sole nation – one that is not constituted by different categories (of people) with strict borders. The metaphor rainbow nation, frequently used by former President Nelson Mandela, described this nation to be: a new category with fuzzy boundaries. Against the background of a cognitive process which Fauconnier and Turner (1996:113) call conceptual blending, Botha (2001:52/53) examines the conceptual nature of the relevant metaphor as follows: “(T)he two input spaces, rainbow and nation, share frame structure on account of its relationship with a generic space: both rainbow and nation imply diversity, composition – actually a diverse assortment or collection (from a generic space). As a result the blend suggests a coloured spectrum and several coloured ethnic groups; but this emergent structure does not only suggest a blending of several coloured ethnic groups of a coloured spectrum into one structure (a nation), but also, and even more importantly, the right of each component to keep its autonomy”.

A speech made by the former Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (presently the President), promoted this blend when he expanded the concept [rainbow nation] in an attempt to extend this category to include other subcategories of Africa. In an address on 8 May 1996, when he made a statement on behalf of the ANC, in acceptation of South Africa’s 1996 constitution bill, he introduced the concept of an African Renaissance. In his address he used the ever returning metaphorical statement of I am an African whereby I is taken to stand successively for the whole of Africa, for the whole nation, or for one of its various ethnic groups. Compare Botha (2001) for a detailed analysis.

A new government and the implementation of the new constitution entailed the reconstruction of a new and a just South African society, and – most importantly – the eradication of racism. Consequently new ideological practices created new concepts and the comprehension of such concepts, not only to understand the relevant procedures but also to make a positive contribution to the nationally set objectives, became paramount. Concepts like [transformation], [redress], [black empowerment], [affirmative action], [quota systems], [reconciliation] and many others came into existence. Compare Botha (2004, 2004a, 2007) for a comprehensive discussion of the conceptual contents of some of these terms.

Within the present South African community all of these concepts are – some unambiguously, others in a disguised manner – in a way linked to the concept [racism]. Having a clear understanding of the relevant concept will obviously contribute to a more appreciative and healing society.

But in February / March 2008 one became very aware of the conceptual complexities of the relevant term within the present-day South African community. It was also very obvious that the meaning people have of the specific term relates to what Taylor (2002:187) calls the conceptualization in the minds of language users.

Conceptualization of racism

On 28 February 2008 a reader of The Citizen (a South African news paper) wrote: “There is something terribly wrong with the students of the University of the Free State’s Reitz residence who participated in the video depicting crass racial abuse of campus workers.” This incident took place the previous year, allegedly as a reaction to forced integration within students’ residences by the university authorities.

When this incident became known, it generated vigorous emotional responses not only from within South Africa, but also from abroad. Although this incident was mostly condemned, it became clear that the conceptualization of racism, which was considered as the source of the specific incident, has many faces. The following cursory quotes and summaries in this regard, from different sources, clearly illustrate this phenomenon. After being quoted, certain perspectives on racism will be discerned from the relevant quotes – preceding a linguistic assessment of the concept [racism].

(1)   The chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission, Jody Kollapen, made, amongst others, also the following comments, as reported by the Mail & Guardian Online: “… the lessons we can learn from the last two or three weeks is that racism is alive and well in South Africa …”; “the reconciliation process was at the expense of transformation …” … “in terms of transformation hardly anything was asked of white South Africans …”; “… white South Africa was not really given the opportunity to engage with what happened in the past …”; “… the constitutional right to freedom of association should not be used as a disguise for racism …”.

(2)   In reaction to the previous comments, two commentators subsequently observed as follows. Giliomee (2008) asks the question whether Kollapen really thinks that, what Giliomee calls ethnic cleansing of whites from the government service and semi-government service to make these institutions more representative of the South African population, was no “contribution” from the whites. In the same breath he praises Barack Obama for his view that one should try to understand both black and white anger in the USA – the first because of injustices of the past and the latter because of affirmative action. Greyling (2008) points out that Kollapen promotes the idea of collective guilt when he requires from white people – all white people, and not only those who supported apartheid – to ask for forgiveness.

(3)   In another article Greyling (2008a) refers to the view of a prof. Sipho Seepe, who suggests that one can only “solve” the problem of racism if one can understand it. Greyling doubts whether it is possible to have a full understanding of the concept at all. Another important aspect that Greyling mentions is the fact that Seepe views racism as something that is only experienced by blacks. Contrary to such a view, Greyling points out examples from the South African society to illustrate that whites also experience racism.

(4)   Buys (2008) also distinguishes between black and white racism. In his view racism under black people is usually to be found under the black elite, while amongst white people it manifests itself in the midst of what he calls the “lower levels” of the community.

(5)   From a black perspective Lizeka Mda, previously deputy managing editor of the Sunday Times and executive editor at The Star (South African English newspapers), responding on the most recent South African racial incidents, made the comment in Rapport (Afrikaans Sunday newspaper) that “when nonsense was issued, white South Africans were the foremost recipients”.

(6)   Esterhuyse (2008) uses the metaphors black elephant and white elephant not only to make a distinction between black and white people, but also to suggest the underlying destructive force of racism within sections of these communities. He also uses another metaphor to label the word racist: a political sledge-hammer that is used to batter people, institutions and groups. He also distinguishes between what he calls naked racism, the practice that considers people of the “other” race as incompetent and inferior, and subtle (or hidden) racism, when somebody tries to “explain” a racial incident.

From the previous comments and remarks involving the phenomenon racism, an extraction can be made of a few cognitive principles that are linguistically very significant with regard to the meaning and understanding of the concept [racism], summarized as follows:

·        The fact that some commentators consider the judgment of racism from a black as well as a white perspective, while others consider the practice thereof to be an only white issue and the experience of racism as an only black concern, suggests that racism relates to vantage point.

·        Reference to whites as if they are all alike (within other contexts reference to blacks as if they are all similar) lay emphasis on the stereotyping mechanism underlying racism. As such it relates to the cognitive principle of categorization.

·        Racism has an instigator as well as an experient. Mostly an instigated act is judged to be an act of racism by the experient or an allegedly non-involved observer by way of sympathy, empathy or moral judgment.

·        The condemnation of the specific incident that generated the intense debate about racism, by both whites and blacks, put the accent on the moral basis of the judgment of racism.

·        Due to its complex nature, the category which the concept [racism] entails, inevitably gets subcategorized and metaphorized; compare naked racism; subtle racism; hidden racism; white racism; black racism; etc.

The diverse nature of the relevant concept, as illustrated in the previous paragraphs – but also within a broader view, relates to the fact that onomasiological[1] and semasiological views with regard to the concept, overlap. Although Taylor (1995:262) postulates that onomasiological and semasiological views do not necessarily reflect “mirror images of each other”, he also acknowledges the fact that a specific linguistic expression is mostly determined by onomasiological as well as semasiological salience (cf. Dirven and Verspoor, 1999:54). This could perhaps be the reason why some people very often allege that they experience racism, but fail to label the relevant experience in terms of defining words. This was clearly illustrated by De Wet (2004) in a research on educators’ experience of racism in education in South Africa. It was found that 64% of the respondents in an empirical study abstained from answering the question “What is racism?” – although they alleged that they experienced racism in their working environment.

Whilst the previous discussion mainly concentrated on a conceptualist view of racism, it is essential for a clearer understanding of the relevant concept to also verify the meaning of the word racism from a semasiological perspective, examining the different senses of the word in an effort to establish a prototypical meaning.

Many analyses of the relevant concept fail to integrate the two approaches efficiently in an effort to establish a working definition for their assessment of the relevant phenomenon. Some only concentrate on different lexicographical definitions, whilst others take a rather intuitive stance, relying mainly on their own conceptualization.

Defining racism

A working definition

An ideal working definition should be the result of a prototype approach in the sense in which Langacker (1987:371) describes it as “a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype”. In this regard one should also bear in mind that there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity, often determined by different cultures and different contexts.

But what would be the best instance of racism in the same sense that murder is a better example of the category kill than execute, lie is a better example of the category cheat than deceive, stride is a better example of the category walk than pace, and grasp is a better example of the category clutch than hold (cf. Pulman, 1983:113)? In other words, does the same superordinate-hyponym-relation exist between racism and a word on a hyponym-level, functioning as a prototype of the specific category – like murder and execute are hyponyms of kill, etc.? Unfortunately not.

Consequently it is not strange that Groenewald (2004:14) points out that on a definition of racism, sociologists differ immensely. This is probably true for many other disciplines as well, given that so many accusations and denials of racism lead to a confused comprehension of the relevant concept when people are asked to define it. She also mentions that there exists some general consensus between several authors within the specific discipline that there should not be any reason why the term cannot have different meanings, based on the argument that accepting too broad a definition renders the term “analytically meaningless”. Such an approach indeed creates a chameleon, changing its colours within the contexts it is being used – a typical vantage point phenomenon. In this regard Groenewald (2004:8) suggests that legislators should understand how different groups define racism, when they promulgate laws against racism, or else a proposed law will probably not be legitimate in the eyes of the majority.

Another relevant aspect that Groenewald (2004:8) mentions, involves the research of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). She regards their inquiry into racism in the media as probably the most prominent recent study involving original research on racism in South Africa, at that stage: 2004. They commissioned the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) to undertake quantitative research on racism in the media. Although the MMP used stereotypes to measure racism, they did not define racism explicitly, and conducted their research on such a fragile basis. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not concerned with an explicit definition of racism, according to Groenewald (2004:14). Her conclusion: “It therefore reviews international and local conventions for regulating and eliminating racism without conceptualizing the term.”

Confronted with the fact that the SAHRC did not depart from an explicit definition of racism, they referred to the definition accepted by the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racism and Discrimination (ICERD), according to Groenewald (2004:29). The relevant definition reads as follows:

Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (SAHRC, 2000: 56).

Groenewald’s observations underpin the fact that the concept [racism] is mostly dealt with on account of rather intuitive judgments of the meaning of the specific linguistic expression representing the concept.

In search of a prototype

The above-mentioned definition of the ICERD also illustrates the intertwined relationship between the onomasiological and semasiological perspectives, although in an unsystematic fashion. In spite of its shortcomings, the application of the deverbalized nouns (distinction derived from the verb to distinguish, exclusion derived from the verb to exclude, restriction derived from the verb to restrict and preference derived from the verb to prefer) illustrate a few important matters. Firstly, the deverbalized nouns imply that racism is the result of one or other action (deed). This issue wil be returned to. Secondly, the application of the different deverbalized nouns suggests a lexicographical (sense-relation) approach, and as such a semasiological perspective. Very conspicuous is the fact that the word discrimination is not used in a sense-relation manner within the relevant definition, particularly when one considers the fact that the research of De Wet (2004) reveals that 88% of the 36% who did answer the question “What is racism?”, used the word discrimination to explicate the concept [racism].

Botha (2006:117) argues that due to the fact that many people use the words racism and discrimination interchangeably, on the assumption that the one implies the other, substantiates the view that there exists a close sense relationship between the words racism and discrimination. He also assumes that in many contexts the tie between the two concepts becomes so close that language users often fail to recognize the fact that the relevant concept’s relation depends on the principle of unilateral implication (hyponymy); hence the word racism implies discrimination, but the word discrimination does not necessarily imply racism.

Although it was hypothesized, earlier in this discussion, that one of the hyponyms on a co-hyponym level generally functions as a prototype of the relevant superordinate, we find the opposite in the case of the concept [racism]. The sense of discrimination is encapsulated by the concept [racism]. Accordingly discrimination can be considered as the prototype of racism, but with a reservation: a sense has to be added – in this instance racial; therefore racial discrimination, to distinguish it from other kinds of discrimination, for instance sexism.

To substantiate the previous claim that discrimination can be considered as the prototype of racism, Botha (2006) also examines the lexicographical definitions of the word racism from six different English dictionaries[2]. Compare Botha (2006) for a detailed discussion. The concept of differentiation is implied in all the definitions, explicitly spelled out as “discrimination” in Merriam-Webster OnLine and Compact Oxford English Dictionary. Consequently one has to investigate the nature of the concept [discrimination].

Discrimination as a prototypical act of racism

Although most of the lexicographical definitions of racism refer to racism as a “belief” as its primary sense, they also refer to some kind of “behaviour” on account of such a belief as a secondary sense. But it is important to be aware of the fact that the linguistic expression racism is not derived from a verb. One must also realize that a belief can only manifest itself by way of one or other act (or deed). Therefore the concept [racism] is exemplified by a more cognitive convenient concept that could be related to an action by way of its linguistic manifestation in a root verb, namely to discriminate. This also contributes to the fact that the concept [discrimination] functions on a prototypical level to unveil the concept [racism]. Consequently, to have a better understanding of racism, one should also focus on the root thereof, namely the verb to discriminate.

Scrutinizing four different dictionaries’ treatment of the polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate, Botha (2006:118-120) finds that a distinction should be drawn between two basic senses of the verb to discriminate. The first sense relates to a basic conceptual action which determines categorization, something we do when we become aware of the difference in or between entities. In this regard the verb to discriminate entails the practice of categorization, the most fundamental conceptual experience in thought, perception, action and speech, according to Lakoff (1987:5). The second (race-related) sense refers to actions or attitudes: “show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)” (cf. Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus).

The question arises: How does the basic senses of the verb to discriminate relate to the concept [racism]?

A historical view reveals that a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate should not necessarily be regarded as the primary sense. According to the Oxford Talking Dictionary the first recorded use of the word discriminate took place between 1600 – 1629, while the first recorded use of a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate took place between 1870 – 1899, and it was only 1930 – 1969 that the first recorded use of the word racism took place.           

But some dictionaries also differentiate between the terms racism and racialization, although they consider them as synonyms, regarding racism as a dated term (cf. American Heritage Dictionary; Collins Dictionary of the English language). Contrary to such a view, Miles (1989), as quoted by Gullestad (2004:185-186), differentiates between the two terms: “While racialization is a natural cognitive process, racism is a negative continuation of that process.” In view of the two basic senses of the verb to discriminate, referred to in the previous paragraph, the concept [racialization] relates to the first basic sense of the verb to discriminate while the concept [racism] entails the second primary sense of the relevant verb.

The practice of racism

As was mentioned previously, there is no consistency within many monolingual dictionaries with regard to discrimination as part of the meaning of the word racism. They mostly refer to a “belief that races have distinctive … characteristics” (cf. Collins English Dictionary), therefore implying a conceptual process of differentiating. By implication they also admit that a belief will not be visible without any explicated manifestation. As a result they suggest an act and also a resulting effect as part of its meaning of the word; compare: “… the resulting unfair treatment of members of other races …” (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary); “… any program or practice of racial discrimination, segregation, etc., specif., such a program or practice that upholds the political or economic domination of one race over another or others” and “feelings or actions of hatred and bigotry toward a person or persons because of their race” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary); and “discrimination, or antagonism based on this” (i.e. belief) (Oxford Talking Dictionary).

Against this background, and assuming that the two senses of discrimination (“categorization”  and “race-related actions and attitudes”) can be considered to relate to racialization and racism respectively, the following model is a modification of Botha’s (2006:126) proposal for a differentiation between neutral race-related categorization and a prototypical racist act.

Figure 1. Prototypical discriminating act, constituting either racialization or racism

Figure 1 represents a dichotomy of discriminating actions. Both actions originate in the cognitive unconscious, but they take different routes due to different intentions. Should one have an unbiased intent, to categorize for conceptual purposes only, then the end result (effect) will be referential in nature, disclosed by referring (descriptive) expressions. Such a discriminating act will represent the final and neutral stage on the continuum: non-racism – racism.

Should the intent be biased, it results from the fact that the specific individual wants to categorize (on the basis of racial criteria) to cause individual or collective advantage(s) and/or disadvantage(s) – physically, socially, culturally, mentally, descriptively or other. It implies the blend with numerous other conceptual maneuvers:  adding a specific value; establishing stereotypes; highlighting category boundaries, etc. Such an intent will be strengthened by a relative force – induced by imagined or real personal, social, cultural, political or other powers – determining the degree of racist practice.

As a result a mental and/or physical act takes place. The nature of the (speech) act determines the degree of racism that is explicitly expressed or implicated. Therefore it is very often the case that when a typical racism mechanism like stereotyping is applied, not only stereotyping as such manifests racism, but also the underlying speech act. Compare for example Kollapen’s words in (1), repeated here as (7):

(7)    “in terms of transformation hardly anything was asked of white South Africans …”; “… white South Africa was not really given the opportunity to engage with what happened in the past …”

This is not only a racist act on account of the stereotyping of whites, but it is also an underlying racist act owing to its speech act nature: an accusation directed to white people as such. In this regard it should be mentioned that an act (deed[3]) is a very complex phenomenon – and if we assume that an act (deed) is an implicit semantic feature of the the word racism, then it is not difficult to understand why people have so many different conceptualizations of the relevant word.

The effect of a prototypical racist act is beneficial and/or disadvantageous to specific individuals and/or groups with respect to personal, emotional, social, cultural and other relevant experiences. The model in figure 1 shows that the effect of the relevant act manifests itself on a continuum. On account of such a continuum one could distinguish degrees of racism, such as a non-racism, subtle racism, mild racism and harsh racism. Gullestad (2004:186) doubts whether racialization in a neutral sense is possible when she postulates:  “Interpretations of differences are not universal, but emerge in historically specific processes as human beings give meaning to what goes on around them. When some physical features appear as particularly visible, it is not only due to the features themselves, but to historically specific frames of interpretation that have become self-evident and self-explanatory for many people. Visibility, in the sense of prominent features that are invested with particular meanings, is not natural and universal but is historically specific and culturally produced and reproduced through fleeting and shifting negotiations.” Her interpretation is indeed acceptable, but only when one considers the distinction between racialization and racism as absolute – and not a matter of degree!

Conclusion

The phenomenon racism undeniably constitutes a very complex concept on account of the fact that people within different contexts conceptualize it differently.

The previous discussion emphasized some of the key issues with regard to such a conceptual confusion. One of the main reasons involves the fact that the noun racism is not derived from a specific verb, although accusations of racism mostly depend on experiences of acts (therefore explicated by specific verbs) of alleged racism. Such acts are so diverse in nature that it is impossible to give an inventory of possible verbs denoting possible racist actions. Even the ICERD’s definition of racism implies alleged racism verbs (to distinguish, to exclude, to restrict, to prefer) that have no relation to racism at all when it is viewed out of context. Contrary to such a definition many people, on an intuitive basis, experience racism as a kind of discrimination – although many lexicographical definitions do not formulate it as such.

For whatever reason it should be necessary to define or describe the concept [racism] – political, scientific, religious, etc. – this article takes the view that a systematic and comprehensive linguistic account should motivate it. In this regard there should exist an awareness of the fact that onomasiological as well as semasiological approaches – and an intertwined relation between the two approaches – contribute to a full understanding of the relevant concept; that the concept [racism] implies an underlying verb of action, first and foremost the verb discriminate; that a distinction can be drawn between the concepts [racialization] and [racism], and that these two concepts merge on the basis of discriminatory experiences reflected on a continuum.

Should this not happen, one finds contradictions such as the following. In explicitly dealing with the “racism-relevant” concept [equality], the South African Constitution implicitly condones certain kinds of discrimination, formulated as follows:

(8)   “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race[4], gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.

   Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair”.^[5]

Contrary to that a Bill of Rights protects the defined rights of every citizen, with a guarantee, amongst others, of nonracism.

Should all the confusions about the concept [racism] be taken into consideration – and the fact that vantage point plays a very important role with regard to the understanding of the relevant concept – one can indeed conclude that racism is an omnipresent chameleon!

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29.  Miles, Robert. 1989. Racism. London: Routledge (referred to by Gullestad, 2004).

30.  Microsoft. 1996. Excerpts from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition © 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation.

31.  Compact Oxford English Dictionary. 2006. http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/racism?view=uk. Accessed April 2008.

32.  Pulman, S.G. 1983. Word meaning and belief. London & Canberra: Croom Helm.

33.  SAHRC. 2000. Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media. Johannesburg: SAHRC (as quoted by Groenewald, 2004).

34.  Rautenbach, Ignatius M. and Erasmus F. J. Malherbe. 1998. Wat sê die Grondwet? Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik.

35.  Taylor, John R. 1995. Linguistic Categorization. Prototypes in Linguistic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

36.  Taylor, John R. 2002. Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

37.  The Citizen. 2008. Opinion articles tagged ‘University of the Free State’. They urinate on the rainbow nation. http://www.citizen.co.za/index/keysection.aspx?section=Opinion&kw=University%20of%20the%20Free%20State. Accessed March 2008.

 

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[1]The onomasiological approach to meaning investigates the relationship of a concept with regard to different words used to refer to the relevant concept, while the semasiological approach examines the different senses of a word (cf. Dirven and Verspoor, 1999:31-59).

[2]Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary; Compact Oxford English Dictionary; Encarta World English Dictionary; Merriam-Webster OnLine; Oxford Talking Dictionary; Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus.

[3] Examining the radial network of the word deed, Botha (2006a) accentuates the complexity of its semantic nature. Compare Botha (2006a).

[4]This paper is only concerned with the concept race.

^[5]Act 108 of 1996: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 1: Bill of Rights, p. 7.

The linguistics of racism

Paper read on 5 July 2005 at a conference of the International Society for Political Psychology in Toronto, Canada

 

1. Introduction

·        Racism in South Africa is alive and well! That is at least the impression one gets when one opens a daily newspaper and takes notice of the frequency of the word racism (and related words) that appear in news and in-depth articles.

·        Ironically, post-apartheid South Africa is supposed to be ridden from the practices of racism - especially when one takes into account the fact that the South African Constitution deals explicitly with the "racism-relevant" concept equality.

·        But the essence of the problem lies, in my view, in the formulation of the relevant articles 9 (3), (4) & (5), reading as follows:

  9. (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

   (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.

   (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.

·        Although the principle of fair discrimination is also accepted in other communities, for instance the Dutch community - in which case it is called "positieve discriminatie" (positive discrimination) - the essence of the problem lies in the principle itself, as it is reflected by the adjectives fair and unfair and the noun discrimination with regard to the practices of racism - but most importantly, in the way people understand these concepts pertaining to its linguistic use and its relevant communicative and social practices.

·        Should semantic criteria be taken into consideration, the adjective fair falls within the class adjectives of judgement. As such its meaning does not suggest factuality. Consequently, individual judgement will determine many different readings of the sense of the relevant word.

·        Another complicating factor with regard to the adjective fair involves the fact the experience of its meaning reflects the conceptualizer's moral judgement on account of a certain fairness metaphorical model (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:297). With regard to the model of equality of distribution Lakoff & Johnson (1999:297) rightly illustrates the complexity of the fairness concept in the following words:

"(T)here are a myriad of cases in which people generally agree on the necessity of some procedural rules of distribution, but find at times that following those 'fair' procedures results in a distribution of goods or opportunities that conflicts with their sense of rights-based fairness or equality of distribution fairness. In such cases there is typically no overarching neutral conception of fairness that can resolve the conflict of values."

·        In this regard fairness could lead to what Gullestad (2004:187) calls "racism in the name of the good".

·        Within the limits of this paper racism in relation to morality can not be dealt with furthermore. The next section will therefore focus on the parameters of this talk.

2. Theoretical framework and structure

·        Against the background of the above-mentioned principle, I will scrutinize aspects of the concept racism from a cognitive linguistic view. The analysis will be done in view of two general theoretical assumptions within cognitive linguistics, that is:

1. The conceptualist approach to meaning renders more viable analytical mechanisms than the language-world approach and the language internal-approach - although the language internal-approach will be taken into consideration when the dictionary descriptions of the relevant concept is scrutinized.

2. Language structure provides important evidence about fundamental mental phenomena which have general psychological importance, and which are founded on linguistic evidence, such as force dynamics, image schemas, subjective versus objective construal, correspondence across cognitive domains, and  cognitive reference point - cf. Langacker (1993:1).

 This paper will be structured as follows:

1. A few dictionary definitions of the word racism will be examined.

2. A distinction will be made between the words racialization and racism. Reference will be made to the imprint of racism by virtue of underlying image schemas and categorizing mechanisms.

3. The fundamental nature of racism will be scrutinized on account of a prototypical act of racism.

 3. Dictionary definitions of the word racism

·        Departing from a language-internal approach, an analysis of the definitions of the word racism from three different dictionaries reveals a rather complex conceptual structure. In this regard the following observations can be put forward:

1. The word racism embraces concepts associated with words like prejudice, animosity, belief, adherence to, advocacy, doctrine, program, practice, feeling and action on the presumption that people are to be differentiated on account of different characteristics which are manifestations of superiority or inferiority. It is also assumed that the conceptual contents of words like prejudice, discrimination and antagonism link with the relevant concept.

2. It appears that there exists no lexical interrelationship between the word racism and the associated words, merely because they are not associated on account of equivalence of meaning (synonymy), or as a result of opposite meanings (antonymy), nor meaning inclusiveness (hyponymy). [It does not imply that the relevant word does not belong to other lexical networks.] This phenomenon could be one of the reasons that in a 2004-research on educator's experience of racism in education (in South Africa), it was found that 64% of the respondents in an empirical study abstained from answering the question "What is racism?" (cf. De Wet, 2004:28). The same research also revealed that 88% of the 36% who did answer the question, used the word discrimination (cf. De Wet, 2004:31) to explicate the relevant concept. From a linguistic point of view, this finding illustrates a basic cognitive principle: we tend to exemplify (understand) more abstract concepts in terms of more specific concepts - in this instance an action. In other words: racism is not an act(ion); but to discriminate is - to be precise, the word racism does not have a verb correlate, but discrimination has: to discriminate. Incidentally, this linguistic feature applies to perhaps the most - if not all - -ism-words, for instance capitalism; communism; socialism; etc.

4. Discrimination as a prototypical act of racism

·        The previous assertion, namely that the concept racism is exemplified by a more cognitive convenient concept that could be related to an action by way of its linguistic manifestation in a root verb, is implicitly revealed in most lexicographical definitions of the word racism - since the phenomenon 'racism' primarily deals with differences. But differences have to be brought to the fore by an action! From this point of view one could deduct that the concept discrimination functions on a prototypical level to unveil the concept racism. This view is supported by the Van Dale (Dutch) dictionary which considers the sense "discrimination owing to race" as one of the fundamental lexicographical definitions of the word racism. If this is the case, a more fundamental investigation should turn the focus to the root, namely the verb to discriminate.

4.1. Polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate

·        An examination of different dictionaries' treatment of the polysemous senses of the verb to discriminate discloses a rather irregular semantic pattern. Within lexicographical practice three major ordering patterns exist to arrange these senses, namely on historical grounds, primary vs. secondary meanings and empirical analysis (referring to the frequency of the relevant word's use). The Webster's New World Dictionary & Thesaurus differentiates between the transitive and intransitive uses of the relevant verb, listing the senses respectively as follows:

 "1 v.t. to constitute a difference between; differentiate. v.t. 2 to recognize the difference between; distinguish. v.i. 1 to see the difference (between things); distinguish. v.i. 2 to be discerning. v.i. 3 to make distinctions in treatment; show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)."

·        The Oxford Talking Dictionary follows a similar model; compare:

"1 v.t. Make or constitute a difference in or between; distinguish, differentiate. E17. 2 v.t. Distinguish with the mind; perceive the difference in or between. M17. 3 v.i. Make or recognize a distinction, esp. a fine one; provide or serve as a distinction; exercise discernment. L18. 4 v.i. Make a distinction in the treatment of different categories of people or things, esp. unjustly or prejudicially against people on grounds of race, colour, sex, social status, age, etc. L19."

·        The Encarta World English Dictionary also distinguishes three senses, but contrary to the previous dictionaries, it puts the race-related sense first - consequently, and presumably, the primary sense, according to this dictionary:

"1 intransitive verb treat group unfairly because of prejudice: to treat one person or group worse than others or better than others, usually because of a prejudice about race, ethnic group, age group, religion, or gender. 2 intransitive and transitive verb discern difference: to recognize or identify a difference · could not discriminate between red and green. 3 intransitive verb be aware of differences: to pay attention to subtle differences and exercise judgment and taste."

·        The Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal (Dutch Dictionary) distinguishes two senses, and in accordance with the Encarta World English Dictionary, they consider the race-related sense as the primary one.

"1 discriminatie toepassen ten opzichte van, niet gelijk behandelen de Chinezen in Maleisië voelen zich gediscrimineerd. 2 tussen twee gelijkende voorwerpen onderscheiden een microscoop met een uitstekend discriminerend vermogen."

4.2.      First recorded uses of the basic senses of the verb to discriminate and the noun racism

·        When we examine, from a historical point of view, the first recorded uses of certain senses of the words to discriminate and racism, some uncertainty arises regarding the fact that a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate should be regarded as the primary one; compare the following historical facts in connection with different senses, according to the Oxford Talking Dictionary:

1. The first recorded use of the word discriminate took place between 1600 - 1629.

2. The first recorded use of a race-related sense of the verb to discriminate took place between 1870 - 1899.

3. The first recorded use of the word racism took place between 1930 - 1969.

4.3.      Distinction between the basic senses of the verb to discriminate

·        The previous analysis suggests that a distinction should be drawn between two basic senses of the verb to discriminate. The first sense relates to a basic conceptual action which determines categorization, something we do when we become aware of the difference in or between entities, something we do when we "distinguish with the mind" (Oxford Talking Dictionary). It is important to notice the use of the prepositions in and between in this description. In this regard, the verb to discriminate entails the practice of categorization, the most fundamental conceptual experience in thought, perception, action and speech, according to Lakoff (1987:5), explicated by him as follows:

"Every time we see something as a kind of thing … we are categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of things … we are employing categories."

·        The second (race-related) sense refers to actions or attitudes with regard to the prepositions for or against, as described by the Webster's New World Dictionary & Thesaurus as "show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)".

4.4.      The relationship between the basic senses of the verb to discriminate and the concept racism

·        The previous distinction links with different approaches Gullestad (2004:177-203) discusses with regard to the definition of racism. She examines two anthropologists' definitions of racism as applied to contemporary Norwegian society. Relevant for this discussion is the view of Inger-Lise Lien (1996 - as mentioned by Gullestad, 2004), and the way in which Lien (Lien, 1997 - as discussed in Gullestad, 2004:185-186) sees it according to Miles' (1989) definition, differentiating between the concepts racialization and racism:

"While racialization is a natural cognitive process, racism is a negative continuation of that process."

·        The concept racialization relates to the first basic sense of the verb to discriminate, referred to in the previous paragraph, while the concept racism entails the second primary sense of the relevant verb.

·        In  this respect Gullestad (2004:186) has serious doubts whether the fact that people merely notice differences (the cognitive process referred to as racialization, for instance black and white skin color), can be considered a natural cognitive process. She postulates:

"Interpretations of differences are not universal, but emerge in historically specific processes as human beings give meaning to what goes on around them. When some physical features appear as particularly visible, it is not only due to the features themselves, but to historically specific frames of interpretation that have become self-evident and self-explanatory for many people. Visibility, in the sense of prominent features that are invested with particular meanings, is not natural and universal but is historically specific and culturally produced and reproduced through fleeting and shifting negotiations."

·        This observation relates to MacLaury's (1991:59) viewpoint that the selective emphasis on the prototype choice (of a category) is determined by vantage point - therefore also extended to a certain cultural frame; as a result "(d)ifferent individuals place importance on distinct attributes of the members of a category. Conse-quently, they select different members as prototypical, they rank members at different values, and they contract or dilate a category to different extents." This phenomenon is also evident when a paradigm (category) is conceptually reduced to such an extent that it results in stereotyping, "a conventional idea associated with a word, which might well be inaccurate", according to Lakoff (1987:168).

·        Stereotyping usually underlies the act of discrimination on a racial basis.

5. A racial imprint

·        Both the views of Gullestad and MacLaury tie with one of the fundamental findings in cognitive linguistics, namely the fact that many (abstract) concepts relate to image schemas, which are preconceptual gestalts within the cognitive unconscious. They are acquired by way of our bodily experience of the physical world we live in. Repeated experiences of related spatial and force phenomena create these gestalts - gestalts that are linguistically manifested. Compare how the container image schema enables us to talk of both concrete and abstract containers: in the box vs. in trouble. One of our very basic spatial experiences relates to proximity, and the schema that is based on this experience, is called the proximity schema. In view of the experience of proximity, one has a closer relationship to comforting entities and situations, and a more distant relation to discomforting entities and situations. Taylor (1995:134) maintains that the "degree of emotional involvement and the possibility of mutual influence are understood in terms of proximity".

·        Against this background I want to assume that in a country like South Africa, where an official (racist) policy of apartheid was created and maintained for almost fifty years, the proximity schema had an important influence on many individuals' categorical (group) development. Legislation based on racial segregation enabled this principle - with its closer to as well as its more distant experiences - to be manifested in the social lifes of individuals, to such an extent that one can easily speak of the existence of a racial imprint in the cognitive setup of both black and white people. The fact that De Wet's (2004:28-37) research reveals that both black and white people still experience racism in education, in spite of the stipulations of the Constitution and efforts to build a non-racial society, in some sense supports this view. Although, merely judged on perception, one notices a big difference between the way adults and children accept each other on the basis of race since 1994. Children of different racial backgrounds tend to be more adaptable, and although most adults really persist in efforts to maintain good racial relations, the undertones of racism are very often perceived in potential stereotyping situations triggered by emotional incentives.

·        The previous assumption also rests on another basic mental phenomenon, namely the way in which we construe meaning in a subjectivised or objectivised way. Children, these days, experience the concept of race in a more subjectivised way, to such an extent that they are presumably mostly unaware of the fact that strict conceptual boundaries for the category 'race' could exist. Contrary to this categorical experience adults' views may still be objectivised in many instances - in other words they accept, but they are still very aware of firm differences based on a developed prejudiced view. Such an attitude is very often revealed by emotional experiences of some kind - experiences that relate to category membership.

·        The awareness of race on the basis of the above mentioned experiences relate to the concepts racialization and racism. Racialization implies a subjectivised experience of race, while racism entails an objectivised experience of race, adding (almost certainly stereotyped on account of pre-conceptual schemas) values to differences.

6. Conclusion: the concept racism as a conceptual blend

·        To endeavour a conclusion some of the previous assumptions need to be reiterated.

·        The concept RACISM implies a conceptual blend of many different kinds of actions. The primary action that reveals racism, is exemplified by the verb to discriminate. Examination of the dictionary meanings of this verb reveals two basic senses:

 Firstly, it means to categorize, to apply boundaries in order to place different kinds of entities in different kinds of paradigms on account of certain differentiating criteria. Such a mental action is a normal conceptualizing action.

·        The second sense involves the experience of another kind of mental action that blends with the first one: to add a value to the relevant category. Should this value be based on racial criteria, one could consider it to be a racist intend. But values as such derive from different conceptual blends from a specific experiential frame that involves historical, cultural, social, personal and many other kinds of variables. When Gullestad (2004:186) mentions "interpretation", she actually merges two conceptual operations: categorizing is the first mental operation; adding a value to the category constitutes a next operation. She only mentions the second one.

·        As was mentioned previously, our ability to categorize is the most fundamental mental process in order to make sense of the world we live in, or to give meaning to what we experience. To add a value to a category is just one of many cognitive (also blending) mechanisms we use to manoeuvre a category conceptually. Other mechanisms involve, inter alia, establishing the prototype or prototype schema of a category, determining the resemblance of other category members to the prototype, and to highlight or weaken the boundaries of a category.

·        With regard to racism we can accentuate two variables that determine, in my view, the degree of racist practice. Perhaps one should rather label racism on account of this criterion (the relative effect of racism), rather than the traditional eclectic distinction that is made with regard to the status of the individuals who practice racism and/or to the context it has an effect on: institutionalised (structural), non-institutionalised (individual) and cultural racism. The two views I wish to mention, are:

1. The way in which one manoeuvres a category conceptually on account of a racial criterion, determines the degree of racism one practices. Stereotyping is an example of such a manoeuvre. In such occasions prejudice - perhaps on account of isolated experiences - may play a dominant role. The outcome in such instances may be mild or severe, depending on the status of the racist practitioner or the nature and intensity of the speech act accompanying the racist intend. Should it be racist legislation, like in the previous apartheid South Africa, the racist outcome is very harsh. But even without legislation, stereotyping by a head of state could have a very intense outcome. The way in which racial boundaries are conceptualized, is another intensifying factor. While apartheid South Africa was an example of the application of the strict-boundary-principle, post-apartheid South Africa is not without it. It can be argued that affirmative action, black empowerment, and even transformation as such, rest on this principle. If a minister (of sport) explicitly states that "ethnic blacks" should be the ones who should be benefited the most, then there is little doubt whether it could be considered a racist action.

2. The relative power one has access to, determines the degree of racism one can practice. Legislative power and the way it is executed would obviously be the most vigorous mechanism for the itensity of racist practices. Apartheid South Africa was a good example of such authoritative racist practices - even in linguistic disguise, using synonyms like the following to give a milder image of the concept: separate development, pluralism, etc. Judging the views of different commentators with regard to post-apartheid South Africa, one gets the impression that in many instances the practice of racism presently goes in the disguise of words and phrases like affirmative action, black empowerment, black ethnicity - and even transformation. What one has to take cognisance of, is the fact that the word used can have a weakening or strengthening effect on the impression of the action it refers to. A very interesting phenomenon in this regard is revealing itself presently. Although the government is predominantly black, and the ruling party (the ANC) comes from a black freedom movement, and they are the people who have the power to apply transformation with all its implications, they still accuse white people of racism, while many white people accuse the present rulers of racism owing to the discriminating practices of transformation, affirmative action, black empowerment, implementation of quota systems, creating a work force which will represent the demographic image of the country, etc. - which they not only have the power to practice, but which they are allowed to do under the auspices of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution (as was explicated in the introduction of this paper). This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that many smaller domains of empowerment are still controlled by white people - white people who are still in managerial positions, white people who still have economic and financial power, white people who still have educational power, etc., although the public realm is not a white public space anymore (to use the words of Gullestad, 2004:187).

·        Against the background of the previous discusssion I venture, in conclusion, the following model to present a prototypical act of racism on account of the distinction between racialization and racism.

Figure 1: Prototypical discriminating act, constituting either racialization or racism

 

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